Abstract: Privacy amplification is an indispensable procedure to share secure secret key between legitimate parties in quantum key distribution (QKD) because a portion of bits are still leaked to eavesdropper Eve after the secret reconciliation. Here, we propose a novel privacy amplification scheme with an optimal hash function. In particular, by utilizing the linear feedback shift register (LFSR) technique, we optimize and simplify the construction of the Toeplitz matrix. In this way, the LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix is used to execute the privacy amplification algorithm. The hardware storage resources can then be drastically saved, and the time consuming will be only about half of that without using the LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix. This work breaks the bottleneck of privacy amplification in high-speed continuousvariable QKD (CVQKD), and thus contributes to the real-time performance of the whole CVQKD system.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a secure way to share secret key between two distant parties called Alice and Bob, without the risk of eavesdropping [1] , [2] . Its security is guaranteed by the quantum mechanics laws, e.g., the Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the quantum nocloning theorem. Currently, two types of schemes, i.e., the discrete variable quantum key distribution (DVQKD) and the continuous variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) are often referenced. The most notable protocol for DVQKD is the BB84 protocol [3] which is proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 . And the best known protocol for CVQKD is the Gaussian-modulated coherentstate continuous-variable quantum key distribution (GMCS-CVQKD) protocol [4] , [5] . Since 1999, amount of theoretical and experimental progress has been made and the performance of CVQKD system has been well improved. Until recently, several research groups have implemented highspeed CVQKD system [6] - [8] .
Generally, a standard CVQKD scheme includes four phases [4] , i.e., quantum communication, parameter estimation, secret reconciliation and privacy amplification. In the quantum communication phase, Alice sends a string of X through quantum channel. After performing measurement of quadrature states by using a detector, Bob obtains a string of Y which is correlated to X . Then, Alice and Bob obtain a string called raw key. After that, parameter estimation is indispensable and it determines whether we abort or reserve the subset of remaining strings for reconciliation and privacy amplification. In the reconciliation step, Alice and Bob will achieve a same fix-length key strings called reconciled key by correcting errors within the raw key string. Both the efficiency and speed of reconciliation are essential indicators. However, some information might be leaked to eavesdropper Eve in quantum communication phase. In order to remove this part of information, Alice and Bob will extract the secure secret key from the reconciled key by using privacy amplification algorithm after the reconciliation step [9] - [11] .
A common method of privacy amplification is compressing a string of key U into a series of key U through universe class of hash functions and then the information leaked to Eve is removed. In this way, the secure key will be obtained. The hash function is usually chosen as Toeplitz matrix, whose elements are 0 or 1. Since the length of the reconciled key is usually very long, and then the size of the Toeplitz matrix is very large. Due to the large matrix, the implementation of privacy amplification will cost considerable number of storage resources and slow down the computing speed. Thus, the speed of privacy amplification may be lower than the speed of secret reconciliation and quantum communication, and it will quite affect the real-time performance of the CVQKD system. More importantly, privacy amplification becomes a bottleneck as a matter of fact that the key length should be larger than one 10 million bits in order to reduce the finite size effect [12] - [14] .
To solve this problem, efficient privacy amplification algorithm is in great demand. Until recently, many practical algorithms have been proposed [15] , [16] . In Ref. [15] , Toeplitz matrix was divided into blocks which are separately operated in field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA). In this way, the speed of the process can be improved. Since the division of blocks is suitable for Toeplitz matrix of different size, the scheme is size-adaptive. In Ref. [16] , fast Fourier transform (FFT) is used to calculate different batches independently and graphic processing unit (GPU) is applied to accelerate this process. Although both of the methods speed up the privacy amplification, the consumption of hardware resources is still large.
In this paper, we propose a privacy amplification algorithm for Toeplitz matrix based on linear feedback shift register (LFSR) to save storage space and speed up privacy amplification process. For the storage of elements in the Toeplitz matrix, only one register is needed, which greatly reduces the storage space. Moreover, the Toeplitz matrix is constructed through transition of consecutive LFSR states. At the same time of LFSR states transition, we accumulate the influence of each LFSR state on the final secret key using accumulators. Since the operations of different accumulators are independent, the calculations of different bits of final secret key are parallel and thus the speed of the privacy amplification process increases. Besides, we discuss the implementation of the algorithm and give a simple example to briefly illustrate it. In the simulation, the comparisons between our method and the usual privacy amplification algorithm under the same hardware circumstances are presented. The simulation results show that in the privacy amplification process, our method can save about half of time consuming compared with general way without applying LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the principle of the privacy amplification in CVQKD. In Section 3, the construction of Toeplitz matrix based on LFSR is given. Then we present the implementation of the algorithm in Section 4. In Section 5, the simulation hardware conditions and simulation results are provided. Finally, we give a brief conclusion in Section 6. Fig. 1 . Privacy amplification principle. The hash function is used to distill the final secret key with length r from the reconciled key with length n, so as to eliminate the information leaked to the eavesdropper Eve.
Privacy Amplification in CVQKD

Principle of Privacy Amplification
The privacy amplification algorithm allows Alice and Bob to extract shorter but more secure secret key from a common random string obtained after reconciliation procedure. After privacy amplification, the information leaked to the potential eavesdropper Eve is removed and thus the security of the key string will be enhanced. The theorem of privacy amplification [10] is as follows:
Theorem 1: Let S ∈ {0, 1} n with probability distribution p (s) and Z ∈ {0, 1} r are two random variables, where n and r are respectively the length of the variables S and Z . The joint probability distribution of S and Z is p (s, z). Let G be a member of universal class of hash functions which can map S ∈ {0, 1} n to K ∈ {0, 1} n−r , and that is K = G (S). If the collision entropy of Eve on S satisfy condition H c (S|Z = z) ≤ c, then
where s = n − r . According to Theorem 1, we can calculate the information volume of the reconciled key string leaked to Eve
Obviously, when s is small enough, the information volume leaked to Eve will be approximately tends to zero. Fig. 1 shows the schematic diagram of privacy amplification applying universal class of hash functions.
Approach of Privacy Amplification
Since privacy amplification mainly depends on universal class of hash functions, here we will list two examples to introduce universal class of hash functions briefly. It is noteworthy that regardless of CVQKD or DVQKD, each character of the reconciled key string is 0 or 1, so there is no need to distinguish privacy amplification between CVQKD and DVQKD. In other words, privacy amplification is the same in CVQKD and DVQKD, although CVQKD and DVQKD vary dramatically before this step. In privacy amplification, the binary key string is compressed by the hash function to eliminate the information leaked to Eve, regardless of CVQKD or DVQKD. Since our work is mainly carried out in CVQKD, we mainly introduce the privacy amplification with CVQKD here as examples. Take a simple example, Alice chooses one bit pair randomly and calculates the exclusive-or value of them. It should be stressed that Alice will not pronounce the exclusive-or result in the common channel. She will only announce which bits she has chosen, such as the 100th bit and the 105th bit. Then she will substitute the two bits with the exclusive-or result. In this way, not only the key sequence is compressed, but also the consistency of the keys owned by two ends is guaranteed. In addition, if the eavesdropper Eve has obtained partial information of the bit pair, then the exclusiveor information leaked to Eve is less. Suppose Eve only knows one bit of the bit pair and does not know the other, then she is incapable of obtaining the exclusive-or value. For another case, if the probability of Eve knowing both of the two bits is 60%, then the probability she hits it is 60% 2 + 40% 2 = 52%. The information leaked to Eve will be less and less by repeating the above process continuously. From the above examples we can see that universal class of hash functions reduce the information leaked to Eve while compressing the key sequence.
In fact, universal class of hash functions is a type of functions that map the larger ranges to small ranges. A desirable feature of universal class of hash functions is that when the hash values of two entities are equal, then the two entities are equal. In other words, since the universal class of hash functions can compress the length of a set, two sets are considered same if their abbreviations are the same. Universal class of hash functions can be utilized for achieving fast average performance of various applications, especially for associated memory such as compiler symbol tables or databases. One of the important applications of universal class of hash functions is information secure authentication of a system. The system allows the message recipient to confirm the authenticity of the message, which is not modified or forged by an unauthorized "enemy" [17] .
As a kind of universal class of hash functions, Toeplitz matrix is adopted by many research groups [15] , [16] , [18] , [19] to implement privacy amplification. Considering that the input of privacy amplification is reconciled key and the output is final secret key, we can obtain the final secret key by multiplication of the Toeplitz matrix and the reconciled key. In this way, the reconciled key with length equal to the column number of the Toeplitz matrix can be transferred into the final secret key with length equal to the row number of the Toeplitz matrix. Generally, the column number of the Toeplitz matrix is more than the row number. So, the key sequence is shortened and the information leaked to Eve can be removed. Since the Toeplitz matrix possess the features of simple and parallel computing, it is easy to be implemented on hardware. Moreover, number theoretic transform and fast Fourier transform (FFT) provide various approaches to accelerate its software [16] , [20] .
Finite-Size Effect on Privacy Amplification
In order to ensure the security of the final secret key, finite-size effect should be considered. We will briefly analyse the finite-size effect and its influence on the final secret key rate. Assuming that x and y are the classical variables of Alice and Bob after measurement. Let E be the quantum states of the eavesdropper Eve. The final secret key rate in CVQKD can be expressed as follows [12] :
Where β represents the reconciliation efficiency, I (x : y) is the mutual entropy between the data of Alice and Bob, S(y : E ) is the von Neumann entropy of Bob and Eve, n is the length of reconciled key and (n) refers to the influence of the finite-size effect on the security of privacy amplification. The value of (n) can be calculated by the following formula [12] :
Where H x represents the Hilbert space corresponding to the variable x, n is the length of the reconciled key, ε is a smoothing parameter and ε PA refers to the failure probability of privacy amplification. In fact, both ε and ε PA are intermediate parameters which could be optimized to satisfy the security requirement. Equation (4) illustrates that the length of reconciled key n has a considerable effect on the value of (n) on the condition that other parameters are fixed. Moreover, the value of (n) will be smaller with the increase of n. Similarly, according to equation (3), the secret key rate K will be larger with the decrease of (n). Combining the above two points, when the length of reconciled key n is large enough, the secret key rate will endure small influence. Otherwise, short reconciled key length will seriously reduce the secret key rate. Privacy amplification will remove nearly all the information leaked to Eve. So reducing finite-size effect (n) is a essential process to improve the real secret key rate. However, with the increase of the reconciled key length, the Toeplitz matrix will be enlarged and then both of the storage of elements of the Toeplitz matrix and the speed of privacy amplification will become obstacles to overcome.
Construction of Toeplitz Matrix Based on LFSR
Construction of Toeplitz Matrix
Let M be a k × l matrix and x be a vector. The product of M and x can be expressed as
k×l } is universal class of hash functions. Particularly, we select Toeplitz matrix as M .
As one of the universal hash functions, Toeplitz matrix is easy to be constructed. Since the elements belonging to the same diagonal line are equal, Toeplitz matrix is also called diagonalconstant matrix. More concretely, in a Toeplitz matrix
Considering the above properties, we can obtain the Toeplitz matrix which is as follows:
It can be seen from the above matrix that the Toeplitz matrix can be uniquely determined by initializing the first line and the first column of a matrix, so we only need to store k + l − 1 elements. In CVQKD, we should guarantee the length of the key sequence is long enough to reduce the finite-size effect, so we still need prodigious computer resources to store elements of the Teoplitz matrix.
Toeplitz Matrix Based on LFSR
Linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is a method to construct Toeplitz matrix. This method used to be applied in authentication because of its substantially lower cost in implementation complexity, key size and randomness [21] . The bit number of the register is equivalent to the row number of the Toeplitz matrix and the current value of the register form a LFSR state. Indeed, in the Toeplitz matrix M k×l , the consecutive columns of the Toeplitz matrix are the consecutive LFSR states with length k, so the number of LFSR states is l. Since each column (apart from the first column) in the Toeplitz matrix can be determined by shifting down its previous column and then adding a new element to its top, the LFSR can be a appoach to construct Toeplitz matrix. The next LFSR state can be obtained by shifting down one unit and updating the value of the first bit in the register. Fig. 2 illustrates the correlation between Toeplitz matrix and LFSR states. In contrast with usual matrix defined by k × l elements, Toeplitz matrix defined by only k + l − 1 elements has enormously saved the storage space, but the cost is still too large when the length of input is far longer than output. The Toeplitz matrix based on LFSR is determined by continuous LSFR states with length k and only need a k-bits register. The method using LFSR can be obtained by the following steps: 1) Initializing the first column of the matrix (1-st LFSR state).
2) Shifting down one unit of the first LFSR state.
3) Adding an element to the top position of the second LFSR state. 4) Repeat the above process until the last LFSR state (the last column of Toeplitz matrix) is determined. The initialization is a process of randomly selecting binary strings of length k. In fact, we can set an irreducible polynomial to control the feedback [21] . For the selection of irreducible polynomials, Ref. [22] gives a feasible scheme to find the irreducible polynomials set of degree n. And we only need to randomly choose one of them. Applying this scheme and taking the advantage of the powerful calculating capacity of computer, it is convenient to find irreducible polynomials set of degree n.
Assuming that p (x) is an irreducible polynomial with length k and coefficient p k−1 , p k−2 , . . . , p 0 over G F (2) domain and the initialization state of LFSR is s 0,0 , s 1,0 , . . . , s k−1,0 . According to the steps stated previously, the top element of the (j + 1)−th LFSR state is
The above description illustrates the transition between consecutive LFSR states and the construction process of Toeplitz matrix using LFSR method. Fig. 3 shows the concrete details of the transition. By using the transition of LFSR states, we can obtain all the columns of the Toeplitz matrix and then determine the matrix. In this way, we need only a k-bits register rather than k + l − 1 storage units.
Here, we will give a simple example to illustrate the process. Assuming that the length of the reconciled key is 6 and the length of the final secret key is 4. Let the irreducible polynomial p (x) be x 3 + x + 1 and its corresponding vector is x p = (1, 1, 0, 1) T . We randomly select binary strings 1, 0, 0, 1 of length 4 as the first LFSR state. Then the elements of the first column (from up to down) of the Toeplitz matrix H 4×6 are 1,0,0,1 and the first LFSR state's corresponding vector is u 0 = (1, 0, 0, 1) T . By shifting down we can obtain that the second to fourth elements of the second LFSR state are 1,0,0. Besides, the first element of the second LFSR state is u T 0 · x p = 0. So the second LFSR state is 0,1,0,0 and we take it as the second column of the Toeplitz matrix. In the same way, the second Fig. 3 . The transition between two adjacent LFSR states. Here we obtain (j + 1) − th LFSR state according to its previous j−th LFSR state. Apart from the first element, all the elements of the j−th LFSR state will be shifted down one unit. The first element of the (j + 1)−th LFSR state is calculated by the inner product of the vector constituted with (j + 1)−th LFSR state and the vector constituted with the coefficients of the irreducible polynomial over domain G F (2), which is described by equation (5). to fourth elements of the third LFSR state can be obtained by shifting down the second LFSR state and it is 0,1,0. The vector corresponding to the second LFSR state is u 1 = (0, 1, 0, 0) T and we can calculate the product value u For the usual Toeplitz matrix, its security is based on the randomness of the elements of the first column and the first row, but our method only initializes the first column of the Toeplitz matrix. However, the randomness of this method is not only reflected in the random initialization of the first column of Toeplitz matrix, but also in the process of randomly selecting irreducible polynomial p (x) from the irreducible polynomials set of degree n. In view of the completeness of the irreducible polynomials set, the Toeplitz matrices constructed by irreducible polynomials set contains all the hash functions that enable the equality h p (M ) = c to be established. So the randomness of the Toeplitz matrix is guaranteed. More detailed security proof can refer to [21] .
Privacy Amplification With LFSR-Based Toeplitz Matrix
Since the LFSR method can be applied to achieve the same hashing at a lower cost in implementation, key size and randomness, it was once used in information authentication [21] . Similarly, as a method to construct hash functions, LFSR can also be applied in privacy amplification of CVQKD to increase the efficiency of the process. The advantage of this method is obvious when the Toeplitz matrix is large because this method only needs one column to construct the Toeplitz matrix.
In privacy amplification algorithm, the final key is obtained by the product of Toeplitz matrix and the reconciled key. Considering the characteristics of matrix multiplication and the relationship between LFSR states and Toeplitz matrix, the final secret key can be obtained by the following 
Each accumulator corresponds to one bit of the final secret key. After m (length of reconciled key) loops, the final value of the accumulators h
linear combination:
Where s 0,j , s 1,j , . . . , s k−1,j is the (j + 1)−th LFSR state, M = M 0 , M 1 , . . . , M l−1 is the binary reconciled key string and M j is the (j + 1)−th bit of the reconciled key. For equation (6), we can use a concrete structure to realize it. Let M be the reconciled key with m bits. Let N be the final secret key with k bits. Let H be the Toeplitz matrix we use. Then the number of columns of the Toeplitz matrix H is m, and the number of rows is k, and that is H k×m . Indeed, the consecutive columns of the Toeplitz matrix we use are the consecutive LFSR states of length k. The Toeplitz matrix is characterized by the feature that each column except the first in the matrix is determined by shifting its previous column and adding a new element which is determined by the elements of previous column and the selected irreducible polynomial to the top of the column. Considering the above characteristics, when we implement the privacy amplification algorithm, we set up accumulators with number k to store the final secret key, and set the initial state of the accumulators to 0. Then we set up a linear feedback shift register, so that we can generate linear shift sequence. By judging the input bit M j , we consider whether the elements of (j + 1) − th column of the matrix is placed into the accumulators. If M j = 1, we put the elements of (j + 1)−th column of the matrix into the accumulators. If M j = 0, no operation will be done. In other words, the message bit of the reconciled key is equivalent to enable end, which is devoted to controlling the process of the accumulators. And we can calculate the final secret key while achieving the transition of LFSR states. After m time periods, the final result of the accumulators is the final result of the hash function. At this point, the two parties obtain a consistent key string and the privacy amplification is completed.
For Toeplitz matrix based on LFSR, if we use the serial structure to calculate the final results, the time period required is k × m. But when we use parallel computing structures, the time period required is m. In Fig. 4 , we use a kind of parallel structure in hardware to compute the hash function value of Toeplitz matrix based on LFSR. Since the final secret key is obtained by the multiplication of Toeplitz matrix and the reconciled key, then each bit of the reconciled key is corresponding to one 0 or not depends on the value of corresponding reconciled key bit M j . After m loops, the final value of the accumulators constitute the final secret key sequence. By calculating the result of the equation (6) using the above method, we can obtain the final secret key, and then the privacy amplification process is finished.
Here, we still use the example given at the end of the last section to illustrate the above process. According to the result we obtained at the end of the last section, the first LFSR state is 1,0,0,1 and the second LFSR state is 0,1,0,0 and the third is 1,0,1,0 and the fourth is 1,1,0,1 and the fifth is 1,1,1,0 and the sixth is 0,1,1,1. Let the reconciled key be 1,0,0,1,1,0. The initial values of the 4 accumulators
Since the first bit of the reconciled key is 1, its corresponding LFSR state (the first LFSR stata) will be put into the accumulators. Then the value of the accumulators will be h
Considering that the second bit and the third bit of the reconciled key are 0, the second LFSR state and the third LFSR state are not pushed into the accumulators and thus not participate into the calculation of the final secret key. The fourth bit of the reconciled key is 1, so the fourth LFSR state will be pushed into the accumulators and then the accumulators will be updated again h
In the same way, the fifth bit of the reconciled key is 1, which will make the fifth LFSR state put into the accumulators. Then, we can obtain that h [M ] 
Simulation Results
In order to save storage space and enhance the speed of privacy amplification and further maintain the stability of CVQKD system, we propose a novel privacy amplification algorithm which utilizes LFSR. The Toeplitz matrix M k×l based on LFSR is determined by the first column elements and the selected irreducible polynomial. In this way, we only need k elements to construct the Toeplitz matrix based on LFSR, which are independent of the reconciled key length. Then we propose the hardware implementation of privacy amplification based on LFSR algorithm. Even if the algorithm based on LFSR is theoretically feasible and efficient, simulation is necessary to show the merits of the algorithm. Before we simulate the algorithm, the specific conditions of the simulation should be given. In Table 1 , we presented the server specification we used. Without loss of generality, we selected small packets to test. Although our hardware facilities are not the best, it is sufficient to process our algorithm whose input is only millions of bits.
For the privacy amplification algorithm, we will pay more attention on the algorithm's time consuming. Let the irreducible polynomial p (x) = x 127 + x 126 + x 99 + 1. To show the advantages of the Fig. 5 . When the hardware whose parameters correspond to Value 1 is adopted, the time consuming of the two methods under different key length conditions is given. Fig. 6 . When the hardware whose parameters correspond to Value 2 is adopted, the time consuming of the two methods under different key length conditions is given.
LFSR algorithm more straightforward, two implementations of privacy amplification are evaluated. One is privacy amplification algorithm of Toeplitz matrix based on LFSR and the other is privacy amplification algorithm of general Toeplitz Matrix. It is noteworthy that we need the comparison between the time consuming of two methods under the same hardware conditions. Since one set of hardware parameters is not universal, here we will list two sets to show the advantages of the method we proposed. The hardware parameters of Fig. 5 correspond to the value 1 in Table 1 and The hardware parameters of Fig. 6 correspond to the value 2 in Table 1 . One point needs to be emphasized is that although the memory of the hardware corresponding to value 2 is smaller than the memory in value 1, the clock speed of the processors in value 2 is 3.5 GHz, which is higher than 1.7 GHz in value 1. Since we only use single core of each sever and the memory of both severs are sufficient, the influence of the clock speed on the operation time is much greater than that of memory. Naturally, the time consuming in Fig. 6 is less than that of Fig. 5 . From the Figs. 5, 6, we can see that under the same hardware conditions the time consuming of using LFSR algorithm is nearly half of that without using it. As the last step of CVQKD, the real-time performance of privacy amplification is one of the important components of the real-time performance of the whole CVQKD system. When the reconciled key is larger, more time will be saved. This shows that privacy amplification algorithm of Toeplitz matrix based on LFSR not only saves tremendous memory space, but also greatly increases the speed of privacy amplification.
In fact, different methods have their own characteristics, and correspond to different applicable environments. In Ref. [15] , FPGA can be used for parallel computing, and its convenience of integration makes it probably widely used in engineering. The method in Ref. [16] use GPU to accelerate the FFT operations of different batches, achieving a quite high speed, and fully embodies the characteristics of parallel computing and the advantages of hardware. Besides, the approach in Ref. [20] is based on different conditions to select corresponding algorithm, which has an extensive applicability. Difference from the above methods is that our approach can save the hardware resources obviously, and can double the speed in terms of algorithm. Although the cost is to transfer randomness from the first row of Toeplitz matrix to the selection of the irreducible polynomial, it provides an improving approach in the aspect of algorithm. Moreover, if this method can be accelerated by other methods such as FPGA and GPU and so on, it will further speed up the process of privacy amplification.
When the Toeplitz matrix is enlarged with the increase of the length of the transmission key, the advantages of the Toeplitz matrix based on LFSR will be reflected more obviously because the storage space of the construction of Toeplitz matrix based on LFSR is only one column of the Toeplitz. Since the processing speed of a general computer single core is limited, and we do not use other methods to accelerate, and our purpose is to compare the results using this method or not, so the speed does not reach a very high value. However, the LFSR approach could be combined with other methods such as FPGA and GPU and then the speed of privacy amplification might be further accelerated when the large data packets are adopted. Our algorithm provides an approach for high-speed privacy amplification and then quite contributes to the real-time performance of the whole CVQKD system.
Conclusion
In this article, we propose a high speed privacy amplification algorithm whose Toeplitz matrix is based on LFSR. Compared to others work, we only need a small quantity of storage units. By the transition of consecutive LFSR states, we gradually construct the Toeplitz matrix. At the same time, we use accumulators to record the influence of each LFSR state on the final secret key. When we obtain the last LFSR state, the values of accumulators form the final secret key. The time consuming of our method is far less than the usual algorithm and thus our method contributes to the real-time performance of the CVQKD system.
